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RÉSUMÉ
Ce n’est que récemment que la psychologie et la science cognitives se sont rendu compte 
que les êtres humains ne sont pas des systèmes cognitifs « purs » et que les émotions 
sont peut-être plus qu’une autre forme de cognition. Dans cet article nous discutons de 
l’interaction entre la cognition et l’émotion, sur la base de résultats d’études récentes 
dans les domaines de la psychologie évolutive, de la neurobiologie et de la cognition. Ces 
résultats montrent que les émotions ont une importance primordiale, souvent universelle, 
dans le fonctionnement cognitif humain. Le traitement cognitif avancé, tel que celui mis 
en œuvre dans les cas de la compréhension de texte et de la traduction, a le plus souvent 
lieu après une première évaluation de l’impact émotionnel du texte sur le lecteur. Ce type 
d’évaluation est momentané, non conscient et non cognitif. Il est accompli par un sys-
tème dans l’organisme ayant ses propres règles, différents de ceux du système cognitif. 
L’évaluation cognitive de l’information établit le mode dans lequel l’organisme (y compris 
ses processus cognitifs) va opérer. Il existe des données empiriques qui permettent de 
supposer que les émotions négatives peuvent – instantanément et non consciemment 
– augmenter l’effort et le temps nécessaires au traitement et diminuer la capacité cogni-
tive. À l’opposé, les émotions positives augmentent généralement les ressources cogni-
tives et élargissent l’attention et la créativité. Cela implique qu’aussi bien le traitement 
cognitif de l’information textuelle que son résultat sont inﬂuencés non seulement par les 
capacités cognitives de l’interprète ou par les conﬁgurations émotionnelles du texte en 
soi (l’impact émotionnel voulu par l’auteur) mais aussi (et peut-être même plus) par la 
signiﬁcation émotionnelle subjective que l’information a pour chaque interprète pris 
individuellement.
ABSTRACT
Cognitive psychology and cognitive science have only recently come to acknowledge that 
human beings are not “pure” cognitive systems, and that emotions may be more than 
simply another form of cognition. This paper presents recent theoretical issues on the 
interaction of cognition with emotion, drawing on ﬁndings from evolutionary, neurobio-
logical and cognitive research. These ﬁndings indicate that emotions have a fundamental 
and, often, universal importance for human cognitive functioning. Advanced cognitive 
processing, such as the processing required for text comprehension and translation, most 
of the time follows after a ﬁrst, primary appraisal of the emotional impact of the informa-
tion on the reader. This type of appraisal is momentary, non-conscious and non-cognitive, 
and is carried out by some system in the organism that functions with its own distinctive 
rules, different from those of the cognitive system. Emotional appraisal of the information 
sets the mode in which the organism (including its cognitive processes) will operate. 
Evidence suggests that negative emotions can instantly and non-consciously increase 
processing effort and time and decrease cognitive capacity, while on the other hand, 
positive emotions generally increase cognitive resources and expand attention and cre-
ativity. This implies that both cognitive processing of textual information, as well as its 
outcome, are inﬂuenced not only by the interpreters cognitive skill or by the emotional 
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features of the text per se (the emotional impact that the writer has attempted to gener-
ate), but also (and perhaps most importantly) by the subjective emotional signiﬁcance 
that the information has for each individual interpreter.
MOTS-CLÉS/KEYWORDS
emotion, cognition, unconscious processing, text processing
On the cognitive approach to emotions
Cognitive psychology and cognitive science have both only recently accepted in theory 
and research that the human mind is not purely “cognitive” by analogy to a computer 
system, and that human beings have emotions and feelings which often deﬁne cogni-
tive processes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss why these two academic 
ﬁelds have disregarded a human function so self-evident in everyday life. For some 
scholars (i.e., Still and Costall 1991) this happened as a particular academic ﬁeld – 
cognitive psychology – turned to an approach that dominated most research in the area 
of psychology. Cognitive approaches emerged in the ’60s to replace behaviorist 
approaches that had been dominant for years. According to Bruner (1990: 2-5), this 
was “[…] an all-out effort to establish meaning as the central concept of psychology 
– not stimuli and response, not overtly observable behavior, not biological drives 
and their transformation, but meaning.” However, as Bruner points, very early on 
“[…] emphasis began shifting from ‘meaning’ to ‘information,’ from the construction 
of meaning to the processing of information.” By adopting ideas from logics, linguis-
tics and computer science, the cognitive approach focused on the way people process 
information mainly under controlled experimental conditions (e.g., Hunt 1971, 1978, 
1980; Sternberg 1980); this led to the development of pure “mathematical” models of 
mind, well documented by experimental research.
The ﬁrst book entitled Cognitive Psychology was written by Neisser (1967) and its 
publication has been considered to formally introduce the subject in the academic 
ﬁeld of psychology. The ﬁrst issue of the homonymous academic journal appeared in 
1970. One of the basic principles of cognitive psychology in the ’70s was that the 
human mind could be understood as an information processing system that can be 
studied in terms of its structure and operations. This same principle was adopted in 
the ’80s by a then newly emerging academic ﬁeld, cognitive science.1
Until approximately the mid-80’s, cognitive research considered emotions as 
another type of cognitive information processing, which more or less followed simi-
lar rules. And although several different approaches developed within the cognitive 
paradigm (e.g., Lazarus 1982, 1984; Leventhal 1974; Schachter 1964, 1965), they all 
converged to a common and uniﬁed conception of cognitive processes as playing a 
central and very signiﬁcant role for emotions, a role which, at certain times, may be 
causal. In other words, for traditional cognitive psychology, emotions were one par-
ticular form of cognitive processing and were always determined by cognition At the 
very core of this conception of emotions was the function of “appraisal,” as a momen-
tary, almost automatic cognitive assessment of a stimulus or of a set of stimuli. 
Cognitive psychologists viewed appraisal as the necessary and sufﬁcient cognitive 
component of emotion. This approach to emotions, however, has been proven inef-
ﬁcient to explain many emotional phenomena of everyday life. Since the ’80s, several 
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scholars have questioned the purely cognitive nature that has been attributed to the 
function of appraisal.2
Beyond the cognitive approach
With a very stimulating article entitled “Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no 
inferences,” Zajonc (1980, 1984) initiated a debate (which for some scholars still 
remains open) about which general function, cognition or emotion, takes precedence 
in the processing of information. As an advance organizer to his view, Zajonc (1980) 
used the words of a poem by Cummings, which have particular relevance to our argu-
ment about the emotional aspects of the process of translation: “since feeling is ﬁrst 
/ who pays any attention / to the syntax of things / will never wholly kiss you.” Zajonc 
suggested that many kinds of information are evaluated for their emotional signiﬁcance 
in ways that are non-cognitive; instead, it is the outcome of this primary emotional 
evaluation that deﬁnes how the information will then be cognitively processed. 
In that article, he published results from a series of experiments based on what 
was called the “mere exposure effect.” Accordingly, when individuals are presented with 
a combination of already known and novel stimuli (e.g., Chinese ideograms) for a short 
period of time, and are subsequently asked to report which ones they like better, they 
tend to show a preference for the stimuli they already know. This phenomenon led 
Zajonc to conclude that mere exposure (i.e., familiarity) may be enough for people to 
develop emotional preferences. This ﬁnding in itself would have been perhaps all too 
obvious if another series of experiments had not shown that the mere exposure effect 
holds, even when old and new stimuli are presented subliminally; that is, for very few 
milliseconds, so that subjects feel they did not have enough time to process their rec-
ognition. The subliminal mere exposure effect has since been repeated in many differ-
ent laboratories, and the idea that emotional preferences can be formed by stimuli that 
have not been previously subjected to conscious and elaborate cognitive processing is 
now conﬁrmed by extensive experimental research (e.g., Bornstein 1992).
Zajonc argued that emotions are primary and therefore fundamental. They pre-
cede the cognitive nature of experience and are much closer to the essence and “inter-
nal truth” of things. This, of course, might be commonsense for experienced 
translators and interpreters who are well aware that the ﬁrst reading of a particular 
material is extremely important, in order to get a grasp of the emotional climate and 
the essence of text. But it was not commonsense for academic cognitive research.
Approximately ten years after the publication of Zajonc’s article, a fairly cohesive 
academic ﬁeld on emotional research emerged, not only within psychology, but within 
most of humanities and social sciences. As a newly re-invented ﬁeld, the study of 
emotions has now become interdisciplinary, and for that reason it faces the common 
difﬁculties of most interdisciplinary ﬁelds: problems of terms and deﬁnitions. Often, 
in the literature concepts such as emotion, feeling, affect, sentiment and mood are used 
as synonyms. In the English academic literature, the term emotion is sometimes used 
as a singular term by analogy to the term cognition – that is, as a general taxonomy 
of uniﬁed processes – and at other times in plural (emotions) to denote particular 
feelings of different nature and of various levels of complexity, such as anger, happiness, 
guilt, empathy. In addition, the words affect, feeling and sentiment are sometimes treated 
as synonyms and at other times they denote epistemologically different theoretical 
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constructs and functions; for example, in traditional psychological experimental 
research, the affect is usually selected for the operational deﬁnition of the particular 
emotion tested, while feeling is usually (but not always) chosen to refer to the subjec-
tive experience of an emotion. In traditional psychology, emotions have also been 
closely associated with terms such as drives, motives or arousal, depending on the 
approach (Davou 2000).
Communication between emotion researchers becomes even more complicated 
due to the plethora of deﬁnitions. Early scholars who attempted to integrate the vari-
ous deﬁnitions that appeared in the literature came across hundreds (e.g., Fridja 1986; 
Kleinginna and Kleinginna 1981; Strongman 1987), and the discussion of how each 
term should be most accurately deﬁned still remains open. For our purposes, I ﬁnd 
useful the deﬁnition adopted by Oatley & Jenkins (1995), which more or less sum-
marizes the currently prevailing trend: Emotions are internal states that (i) produce 
psychological and physiological effects, (ii) include cognitive evaluations, (iii) have 
particular muscular and motor expressions, (iv) incorporate a subjective experience 
of pleasant (positive) or painful (negative) feelings, (v) and can be discharged through 
neurological and motor functions.
Emotional phenomena can be traced on a spectrum that expands from acute 
physiological alterations (e.g., an intense emotion such as fear) to personality traits 
of an emotional nature that are relatively more stable (e.g., irritability). From this 
emotional spectrum the following taxonomy can be derived:
(a) an emotion refers to an intense mobilization of a very short duration, a “shaking” of the 
organism as a response to a particular stimulus (person, situation or event), which is 
generalized and occupies the person as a whole,
(b) a feeling (or emotions) is the colour of all experience; it is always experienced in relation 
to a particular object of which the person is aware, it may have various levels of intensity, 
and its duration depends on the length of time that the representation of the object 
remains active in the mind of the individual,
(c) mood is a more generalized state, that does not necessarily has a particular object (rep-
resentation), but gives a general emotional colour to life for relatively longer periods of 
time.
The same emotional state, e.g., fear, can be experienced as emotion or as feeling, 
depending on its intensity, duration and level of processing of the stimulus (i.e., 
whether it is acute, intense and experienced before the object that causes it has been 
represented in the mind, or whether it is longer, less intense and connected to some 
particular representation). If it is experienced as emotion, fear occupies the whole 
person and for a few seconds the person either freezes or tends to ﬂee (e.g., in the case 
of an earthquake). It is interesting to note here that the English word emotion derives 
from the unison medieval Latin word and is based on the Latin preﬁx emot that means 
moving away.3 
The emotion of fear may turn into a feeling of fear, as the object that caused it 
becomes identiﬁed and represented in the mind, while at the same time it colours 
particular decisions and actions directed towards the object. Naturally, the reverse 
process is possible. Fear as a feeling connected to some particular representation (e.g., 
as one thinks of the possibility of an earthquake) may be turned to emotion, if the 
thoughts and actions associated with the fearful event maximize the threat instead of 
removing it and restoring balance. 
 01.Meta 52.1.indd   40 1/7/07   3:22:30 PM
On the interaction of emotion with cognition
In order to examine how emotion and cognition interact at their basic level, we will 
present some evidence from evolutionary psychology and neurobiology, but we 
should acknowledge at least to other ﬁelds of psychology, social psychology and 
clinical psychology, that have also provided evidence for this interaction at more 
complex levels (see e.g., Parkinson (1996), and Silverman and Weinberger, (1985) for 
social and clinical psychology, respectively).
Evolutionary psychology views emotional phenomena from the point of view of 
Darwinian Theory, as phenomena of particular signiﬁcance for survival; their basic 
function is communication and adaptation. For example, fear stimulates self-defence 
activities and protects the organism from dangers of the outside physical and social 
world. Anger is necessary for territorial protection and for setting boundaries to 
intruders of one’s private space (it is useful here to think of space also in its meta-
phorical, symbolic form, i.e., not only physical, but also psychological, social and 
cultural). The communicational function of emotions is self-evident. Simply stating 
that one is angry is not enough to keep the intruder away, if the latter does not trace 
any apparent indications of readiness for attack. At least six emotions (i.e., fear, 
sorrow, anger, happiness, surprise and disgust) are considered primary and are uni-
versally recognized irrespectively of cultural differences (e.g., Ekman 1992). Emotions 
and feelings – as we deﬁned them above – “ring a bell” about the survival value each 
stimulus or piece of information has for the individual that perceives it. Evidence on 
how this bell is “activated” comes from the neurobiological and neuropsychological.
Studying the emotions, LeDoux (1998) has produced evidence that cognitive and 
emotional functions are of a different nature and appear to derive from two indepen-
dent systems, which, however, continuously interact. Ledoux distinguishes emotional 
from cognitive processing of information and introduces the concept of “emotional 
unconscious” to describe the processing of information that has emotional signiﬁ-
cance and takes place without the person’s awareness. Every stimulus perceived by the 
individual is almost immediately (within 200 milliseconds) interpreted for its positive 
or negative valence. Within this fraction of time, the brain is predisposed to function 
in particular ways, although the information that has generated the predisposition is 
not conscious – the individual is not yet aware of what has caused this particular 
positive or negative feeling (Libet 1996; LeDoux 1998).
The emotional content of the information is processed in different areas of the 
brain (e.g., the amygdala) than those which are responsible for the processing of 
cognitive contents (e.g., hippocampus or frontal lobes) (Izard 1992; LeDoux 1995; 
Sarter et al. 1996). This fact, further conﬁrms that there must be two different systems, 
the emotional and the cognitive, with different structure and principles of organiza-
tion, which, however, interact and cooperate.
The emotional content of the information includes cues with evolutionary more 
primitive structure, which do not carry elaborated information material, but have an 
adaptive value and, therefore, the power to: (i) set the brain in a speciﬁc mode of 
functioning in terms of how it organizes information, (ii) prepare biological mecha-
nisms for a series of activities (e.g., ﬁght or ﬂight), (iii) focus attention on particular 
aspects of the environment, (iv) and regulate utilization of the organism’s resources 
(Oatley and Johnson-Laird 1987, 1995). For example, anxiety sets the brain to function 
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in a distinctive mode according to which most informational cues are interpreted 
primarily as threatening to the organism.
Generally, negative emotions and feelings stimulate a rigid and limited focus of 
cognitive resources into coping with one (real or imaginary) problem, and cause per-
sistence to cognitive choices that have nevertheless been proven ineffective (Fredrickson 
1998; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005; Isen 2002). On the other hand, even a momen-
tary experience of positive emotions, such as joy, interest, pride, love or satisfaction 
can be beneﬁcial for structuring and improving available cognitive resources, as well 
as for broadening and enhancing attention, creativity, problem solving ability and 
acquisition of new cognitive schemata (Fredrickson and Branigan 2001).
Most experimental evidence on the interaction of emotion with cognition comes 
from experiments using subliminal priming, a modiﬁcation of the mere exposure 
technique. Two stimuli are presented successively for different amounts of time. The 
ﬁrst stimulus (prime) is ﬂashed subliminally for milliseconds, so that although the 
subject has the impression that something was shown, s/he does not have the time to 
process it adequately so as to register it in memory and recall it later. The stimulus 
that follows (target) is presented supraliminally, that is long enough to allow process-
ing at a conscious level. The research question investigated is whether the ﬁrst stimu-
lus produced any particular predisposition, which may inﬂuence perception and 
interpretation of the subsequent stimulus. When the prime has a relatively neutral 
emotional valence, this technique is called semantic priming, while when there is some 
(positive or negative) emotional valence the technique is called emotional priming. 
These experiments have provided strong evidence that even the mere presence of 
some stimulus (a word, a person, an odor or a sound) is sufﬁcient to produce emo-
tional predispositions, without any prior cognitive processing and out of the individ-
ual’s awareness. These predispositions can inﬂuence not only the emotional and 
cognitive processes that follow, but also more stable attributes of the individual such 
as self-esteem. In Zajonc’s laboratory it was found that a group of psychology gradu-
ate students rated their own research ideas worse if, before making the judgment they 
were subliminally exposed to a scowling photo of Zajonc, who had a reputation of 
being a tough evaluator.4
Bornstein (1992) created a complicated experimental design, which he applied 
with the help of two accomplices (A and B) who were unknown to the individuals 
who participated in the study. The ﬁrst group of participants was exposed sublimi-
nally to the picture of A, while the second group was similarly exposed to the picture 
of B. Then, each participant was asked to take part in a discussion with A and B, where 
the three of them had to read poetry and decide on the gender of a poet who was 
kept unknown. Since the pictures of either A or B were shown subliminally, partici-
pants were not aware that they had seen either of the two accomplices. According to 
the directions of the experimenter, at a certain point during the discussion A and B 
started to argue on the gender of the writer, and they had to continue arguing until 
the subject would intervene to solve their debate. The important ﬁnding in this 
experiment was that participants systematically tended to take the side of either A or 
B, depending on whose picture they were initially exposed to; that is, they tended to 
agree with the person who was non-consciously familiar to them.
After an extended review of related research, Bornstein arrives at the conclusion 
that the mere exposure effect is stronger when stimuli are presented for milliseconds 
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than when they are available to the individual for more elaborate processing. In other 
words, moods and feelings tend to be inﬂuenced more by information that the indi-
vidual is unaware of processing; apparently, conscious processing allows for re-assess-
ments and modiﬁcations of the initial impact of the information.
This ﬁnding is of particular signiﬁcance for the science of translation; it implies 
that repeated elaboration of the material may perhaps lead to a linguistically or 
semantically more accurate outcome, at the expense, however, of the emotional valid-
ity of the original text. The more the translator engages in cognitive elaboration of the 
material the higher might be the risk to re-evaluate and, therefore, depart from the 
initial emotional impact. A second implication of the above ﬁndings is that there may 
be several cues in the material under translation which may have signiﬁcant personal 
implications for the translator, and which could act as subliminal stimuli that generate 
particular emotional predispositions that affect cognitive processing, as well as the 
ﬁnal outcome of the translated text. It may be the general emotional climate (Parkinson 
1996) of the particular situation (be it a text for translation or live discourse or 
speech), or it may be the personality of the source (the writer or the speaker) which 
may have unconscious emotional implications for the translator, and the power to 
inﬂuence mood and emotions. In the area of learning, for example, Boekaerts (1993) 
has shown that when negative emotions create a pessimistic perceptual attitude they 
divert the individual’s attention to aspects irrelevant to the task, which activate intru-
sive thoughts that give priority to a concern for well-being rather than for performing 
the cognitive task.
What is of further importance is that apart from the emotional valence of the 
material, the meaning per se may be non-consciously active in the mind of the trans-
lator, affecting further cognitive processing in non-conscious ways. A study by Fowler 
et al. (1981) indicated that the meaning of subliminal stimuli was available to the 
observer even when the stimuli themselves were not detectable. In this experiment 
words (e.g., “cook”) were ﬂashed on a screen so rapidly that observers were not aware 
of what was presented. However, when this was followed by the presentation of two 
recognizable words (e.g., “bake” and “view”), and the observers were instructed to 
make a forced choice about which word was most similar to the one subliminally 
presented, their choices were signiﬁcantly better than chance.
Results on subliminal semantic priming provide further evidence that material 
of which the individual is not aware can inﬂuence ongoing perceptual judgment 
(Balota 1983), but also the mood with which the person approaches subsequent 
events. To further test the effect on mood, a stimulus with some emotional valence 
(e.g., the picture of a smiling or frowning face) is ﬂashed for 1/200 second (5 milli-
seconds) and is immediately followed by another, neutral (“masking”) stimulus that 
is presented supraliminally. The role of the masking stimulus is to prevent further 
non-conscious processing and recording of the initial stimulus. Then a third “target” 
stimulus is presented also supraliminally (e.g., a Chinese ideogram) and observers are 
asked whether they like it or not. Murphy and Zajonc (1993) found that liking of the 
target stimulus depended on the initial stimulus that was subliminally presented. The 
emotional signiﬁcance attributed to the “target” stimulus (in this case the ideogram) 
depended on the emotional signiﬁcance of the initial stimulus (in this case, on 
whether the face in the picture was smiling or frowning).
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Hermans et al. (1998) showed that the emotional semantic priming effect holds 
for other senses as well. They paired pleasant and unpleasant odours with words of 
positive and negative emotional content and found that the emotional signiﬁcance of 
the target word (i.e., whether it is positive or negative) is recognized in signiﬁcantly 
less time when it corresponds to the emotional content of the preceding odour. That 
is, a non-conscious pleasant smell prepares the individual to recognize more quickly 
a word with pleasant connotations (e.g., “kiss”) than with unpleasant connotations 
(e.g., “murder”).
Further evidence indicates that particular emotions, attitudes and intentions may 
be provoked non-consciously and inﬂuence the individual’s interpretation of social 
circumstances. Bargh (1990) studied the non-conscious effect of stereotypes. In a 
brilliantly designed study, participants were told that they were to take part in a lin-
guistic examination and that their task was to create sentences from a particular set 
of cards. One group of participants had words related to old age (e.g., wrinkles, 
elderly), while the second group had chance words, related to a variety of issues. When 
each participant ﬁnished and left the room, experimenters measured the amount of 
time s/he needed to reach the end of the corridor. And though the sentences produced 
about old age did not particularly refer to physical conditions, those participants who 
worked with these words needed signiﬁcantly more time to arrive at the end of the 
corridor; their pace had been slowed, simply because they had occupied their thought 
with words related to old age. In another experiment, subjects were asked to make 
sentences with words that referred to either assertiveness or politeness. Then, when 
each subject ﬁnished, s/he was asked to ﬁnd the research supervisor who was outside 
the room, involved in a set up discussion with an accomplice. Bargh measured the 
amount of time that the subject waited before interrupting the experimenter and 
found that those who participated in the experimental condition of “assertiveness” 
waited signiﬁcantly less time than the participants in the condition of “politeness.”
Non-conscious processing of words of negative emotional valence can create 
anxiety. In vigorously controlled experimental conditions, Kemp-Wheeler and Hill 
(1987) showed that when unpleasant words are ﬂashed subliminally, participants 
develop anxiety symptoms which are expressed with an increase in perspiration and 
muscular tone (varying from tension to tremor, according to individual parameters). 
The symptoms were absent or at a statistically signiﬁcant lower level in participants 
who were exposed to words with neutral emotional valence. The effect of non-con-
scious processing has also been examined with clinical populations by researchers 
with a psychodynamic orientation (e.g., Silverman 1976; Silverman and Weinberger 
1985). This set of studies showed that subliminal acoustic stimulation with messages 
of emotional signiﬁcance may produce changes in pathology, behaviour and cognitive 
processes as for example problem solving.
Conclusion
Emotional processing of the information is fundamental in every aspect of human 
functioning, but it appears to follow principles different from those of cognitive pro-
cessing. The picture that emerges is of an emotional system, independent but interact-
ing with the cognitive system, an idea that was ﬁrst introduced in a very stimulating 
paper written by Norman (1981). Both systems are at the service of the organism’s 
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well-being and survival. The emotional system carries out a ﬁrst, extremely brief but 
highly signiﬁcant assessment of the potential impact of the information for the per-
ceiver, which determines in various ways the cognitive processes which follow.
For our purposes, here, all this implies that both cognitive processing of textual 
information, as well as its outcome, are inﬂuenced not only by the interpreters’ cogni-
tive skill or by the emotional features of the text per se (the emotional impact that 
the writer has attempted to generate), but also (and perhaps most importantly) by 
the subjective emotional signiﬁcance that the information has for each individual 
interpreter.
What we presented so far shows the power of the information, both in long-term 
memory and in working memory, to generate emotions, feelings and moods that ﬂood 
the person and give colour to thoughts, either enhancing or inhibiting the person’s 
cognitive capacity in ways that remain to be investigated. The emotional valence of 
the information may inﬂuence the cognitive process at every level of processing.
At the level of input, we may expect that positive valence will expand the person’s 
perceptual abilities in an attempt to “take in” more positive stimulation; a crucial 
research question, here, is whether there is a “threshold” of positive emotion above 
which the person cannot absorb or handle any more stimulation. Similarly, negative 
valence at the level of input may predispose the perceiver to “contract” or “close” input 
channels, in order to exclude negative information, and the question may relate to the 
relative “threshold” of negative input.
At the level of working memory, several research questions could be formulated. 
For example, how does the emotional valence of the material affect working memory 
capacity or processing time? Questions relating to the effect of the emotional valence 
of information retrieved from long-term memory – in order to be used for the 
elaboration of the material under current processing – may be more complex; each 
particular person makes use of his or her personal cognitive schemata and experience 
which have a highly subjective emotional value. The same material may create quite 
different emotional and cognitive associations for different people depending on their 
history and experience. This is perhaps one of the reasons why each translator of a 
particular piece of literature practically creates a distinct narration of the same 
original text, often quite different from what its creator had intended. In fact, creativ-
ity may be just that: the different emotional signiﬁcance that stimulates different 
thoughts to different persons.
NOTES
1. The Cognitive Science Association was established in 1980, from scholars of different academic ﬁelds 
with a common interest in the study of cognition. Cognitive science attempted to relate ﬁndings 
from three major research areas, i.e., cognitive psychology, artiﬁcial intelligence and neuroscience, 
all of which study the mind and mental processes, focusing however on different levels of integration 
of the phenomena. Psychology is interested in the macro-phenomena of experience while neuro-
science focuses to the corresponding micro-phenomena in the central nervous system. The ﬁeld of 
artiﬁcial intelligence is more abstract in that instead of describing processes, it offers interpretative 
paradigms of how phenomena emerge as results of a processing activity that is independent of the 
material substratum (hardware) that accomplishes it (Marangos 1996).
2. For a brief presentation of cognitive theories of emotion and for a discussion on the issue of appraisal 
see Davou (in press).
3. The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, Random House, New York, 1975, από όπου 
προέρχονται και οι υπόλοιπες αναφορές στην ετυμολογική ερμηνεία των αγγλικών εννοιών που 
εμφανίζονται εδώ.
interaction of emotion and cognition    45
 01.Meta 52.1.indd   45 1/7/07   3:22:31 PM
46    Meta, LII, 1, 2007
4. This information was derived from an extended article devoted to Zajonc’s work. It presents a sum-
mary of his most important ﬁndings and theoretical points, as well as extended interviews with 
Zajonc and his colleagues, and was published in the Journal of the American Psychological 
Association (Monitor, September 1998, pp. 12-13). Zajonc’s ideas developed after four decades of 
research on emotions and subliminal perception. 
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